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THE GIG ECONOMY’S SHORT REACH: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE SCOPE OF THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT’S “TRANSPORTATION
WORKER” EXEMPTION
Emina Sadic Herzberger*
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governs arbitration
agreements in the United States. Section 1 of the FAA provides
an exemption from arbitration for “contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” In a 2001 decision,
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the residual phrase “any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” includes
transportation workers. But, such language is ambiguous, and
the Supreme Court did not expound upon what it means to be
a transportation worker or to be engaged in interstate
commerce for purposes of the exemption.
Since the FAA’s enactment in 1925, modes of employment
have evolved drastically and now include the recent platformor mobile-based gig economy—one subsect of which includes
delivery drivers working for companies like Amazon Flex,
Grubhub, Lyft, and Uber. Mandatory arbitration agreements
in their employment contracts compel these drivers to arbitrate,
rather than litigate, disputes against these companies.
A circuit split has emerged regarding whether modern gig
economy drivers fall within the “transportation worker”
exemption, with courts divided primarily on whether these
drivers are “engaged in interstate commerce.” Without a
blueprint to follow, lower courts have created their own tests
and applied their own standards to these drivers, leading to
inconsistent results. Some courts have held that the driver does
*
J.D. Candidate, 2022, University of Georgia School of Law; M.A., 2016, Sciences Po Paris;
B.A., 2012, University of Houston. I would like to thank Dean Peter B. Rutledge for his
mentorship and helpful insight on this Note. I would also like to thank Marc Herzberger for
his constant encouragement and support.
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not need to cross state lines to be exempt from arbitration;
instead, these courts look to the companies that these drivers
work for to determine if the company is engaged in interstate
commerce. If so, they find that the company’s workers are
engaged in interstate commerce. Other courts emphasize that
the driver must be a member of a “class of workers” that is
engaged in interstate commerce, thereby requiring the driver to
actually cross state lines to obtain the exemption. This circuit
split highlights the difficulty of applying a near century-old
statute to a modern worker context.
This Note argues that, in the absence of a Supreme Court
ruling or congressional amendment on the matter, lower courts
should not exempt gig economy delivery drivers from
arbitrating employment disputes against their platform
companies because the drivers are not transportation workers
engaged in interstate commerce.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The gig economy is a lucrative industry in the United States: in
2017, approximately 57 million people—or a third of the entire
workforce—engaged in some form of gig work.1 By 2021, estimates
project that the gig economy will contribute over $1 trillion to the
U.S. economy.2 Referred to by various names, including the
“sharing” or “1099 economy,”3 the gig economy often involves
“economic transactions that are facilitated by online platforms that
match customers with providers.”4 The transportation services
sector represents one major component of the gig economy that
employs this online platform system.5 Within the transportation
services sector, last-mile delivery drivers form one subsect of gig
economy workers.6 These drivers transport people and deliver goods
1 TJ McCue, 57 Million U.S. Workers Are Part of the Gig Economy, FORBES (Aug. 31, 2018,
6:30 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tjmccue/2018/08/31/57-million-u-s-workers-are-partof-the-gig-economy; see also Orly Lobel, The Gig Economy & the Future of Employment and
Labor Law, 51 U.S.F. L. REV. 51, 52 (2017) (“The Gig Economy emerged in a perfect storm of
several interrelated developments. Advances in digital technologies, the widespread
availability of handheld devices, and ever-increasing high-speed connectivity have combined
with the realities presented by several cycles of economic downturn, shifts in lifestyle, and
generational preferences.”).
2 Srikanth Karra, The Gig or Permanent Worker: Who Will Dominate the Post-Pandemic
(May
13,
2021,
7:00
AM),
Workforce?,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbeshumanresourcescouncil/2021/05/13/the-gig-orpermanent-worker-who-will-dominate-the-post-pandemic-workforce.
3 See Shu-Yi Oei, The Trouble with Gig Talk: Choice of Narrative and the Worker
Classification Fights, 81 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 107 (2018) (“[B]usinesses such as Uber,
Airbnb, Lyft, TaskRabbit, Rover, and DogVacay represent a new sector and way of providing
goods and services. This group of firms has variously been referred to as the sharing economy,
gig economy, platform economy, 1099 economy, and peer-to-peer economy.”).
4 Charlotte Garden, Disrupting Work Law: Arbitration in the Gig Economy, 2017 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 205, 205 n.1.
5 Josue Aparicio, The Arbitration Hack: The Push to Expand the FAA’s Exemption to
Modern-Day Transportation Workers in the Gig Economy, 54 U.S.F. L. REV. 397, 397 n.2
(2020); see also Michael L. Nadler, Independent Employees: A New Category of Workers for
the Gig Economy, 19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 443, 454 (2018) (“The advent of pocket-sized computers
with GPS, wireless Internet access, and the ability to run complex algorithms connecting
individual users to one another has enabled a new breed of companies that serve as
intermediaries between their users, offering ‘platforms’ or ‘virtual marketplaces’ that connect
those in need of specific services with those offering them.”).
6 See Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc., 966 F.3d 10, 13–14 (1st Cir. 2020) (identifying
Amazon “last-mile” delivery drivers as those who “sign up for delivery shifts and then use
their own methods of transportation . . . to deliver products ordered through Amazon within
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or prepared restaurant meals to customers’ homes or offices.7 While
some platform companies offer only one type of service, generally
either some form of ride-sharing or food delivery, other companies
are expanding their range of services, meaning drivers can
participate in transporting both goods and people through the same
platform.8
Regardless of the platform, there are benefits of working as a gig
economy delivery driver, including a flexible self-created work
schedule,9 the opportunity to gain supplemental or part-time
income,10 and the ability to work seamlessly for multiple platforms
simultaneously.11
a specified timeframe and in compliance with other Amazon service standards”); In re Grice,
974 F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir. 2020) (explaining how the Uber App “connects riders needing
transportation with local drivers available to drive them to their destinations for a fare”).
7 See Aparicio, supra note 5, at 397 (explaining that that the gig economy “relies upon
independent contractors to offer goods and services, including transportation services,”
through ride-sharing platforms like Uber and Lyft, meal delivery platforms like Grubhub,
grocery delivery platforms like Instacart, and some platforms that provide “delivery of
virtually everything under the sun” like Amazon Flex).
8 See,
e.g., Frequently Asked Questions About Amazon Flex, AMAZON FLEX,
https://flex.amazon.com/faq (last visited Sept. 11, 2021) (indicating that Amazon’s Amazon
Flex drivers deliver packages, groceries, household items, and store orders directly to
customers); Uber’s Technology Offerings, UBER, https://www.uber.com/us/en/about/uberofferings/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2021) (indicating that Uber drivers can participate in ridesharing and food delivery); Nitasha Tiku, Desperate Workers Rush to Delivery App Jobs to
Find
Low
Pay
and
Punishing
Rules,
WASH. POST
(May
23,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/05/23/gig-work-instacart-shipt-amazonflex-doordash (noting Uber’s reallocation of 40% of its drivers in the United States and
Canada to its Uber Eats food delivery service early in the COVID-19 pandemic). Rather than
working in multiple roles for one company, some people work for multiple companies. See
Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 904, 938 (9th Cir. 2020) (Bress, J., dissenting)
(“[D]elivery workers often work for multiple services, even at the same time (think of drivers
with both Uber and Lyft stickers on their windshields). An AmFlex worker who also works
for Doordash and is doing the same basic work for both companies would thus be subject to
arbitration based on which company’s ‘hat’ he is wearing.”).
9 Charles Towers-Clark, The Uberization of Work: Pros and Cons of the Gig Economy,
(July
8,
2019,
6:09
AM),
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/charlestowersclark/2019/07/08/the-uberization-of-work-prosand-cons-of-the-gig-economy (“Working on your own terms, with your own hours and earning
your own wage has been a dream since the inception of the office and ‘office hours.’”).
10 See Let’s Drive, AMAZON FLEX, https://flex.amazon.com/lets-drive (last visited Sept. 11,
2020) (advertising general pay rates of $18-$25 per hour).
11 See Memorandum from the Benenson Strategy Group on Findings from Survey of Likely
2020 Voters and App-Based Drivers to Interested Parties 3 (Aug. 25, 2020) (stating that 66%
of Uber drivers surveyed drive for multiple app-based companies besides Uber, including
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To become a driver for one of these platform-based companies,
applicants must accept the terms of use that create a contractual
relationship between the company and the driver.12 An agreement
to arbitrate a dispute, which precludes a driver from bringing a
collective or representative action against the company,13 is
common in these contracts.14 Despite this requirement to arbitrate
disputes, there has been an uptick in suits brought by drivers
against their respective platform employers for employment
contract violations.15 Litigation brought against these companies
conflicts with a recent trend in the United States to view
arbitration, including employment arbitration, favorably.16 In
bringing these suits, drivers argue that they are exempt from
arbitration based on a carveout in the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA).17 Section 1 of the FAA exempts certain classes of workers
from mandatory arbitration, including “workers engaged in foreign

“Lyft, DoorDash, GrubHub, Instacart, or Amazon Flex”); Faiz Siddiqui, Where Have All the
POST
(May
7,
2021,
8:00
AM),
Uber
Drivers
Gone?,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/05/07/uber-lyft-drivers (reporting that as
demand for rideshare services decreased during the COVID-19 pandemic, many rideshare
drivers “turned to food delivery through Uber, DoorDash or other apps as demand exploded
for delivery of meals and household items”).
12 See Aparicio, supra note 5, at 399 (“Contracts that impose mandatory arbitration are
commonplace in the gig economy.”).
13 See 1 IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL
ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION
ACT § 2.1.2 (1995) (“Arbitration is the process whereby parties voluntarily agree to substitute
a private tribunal for the public tribunal otherwise available to them.” (quoting Bel Pre Med.
Ctr., Inc. v. Frederick Contractors, Inc., 320 A.2d 558, 563 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974))).
14 See Garden, supra note 4, at 213 (demonstrating that gig economy employment
agreements generally contain arbitration clauses). Drivers may not even be aware that they
have entered such an agreement. See KATHERINE V.W. STONE & ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN,
ECON. POL’Y INST., THE ARBITRATION EPIDEMIC: MANDATORY ARBITRATION DEPRIVES
WORKERS AND CONSUMERS OF THEIR RIGHTS 4 (2015) (“Because these arbitration clauses are
usually buried in a sea of boilerplate, many people who are subject to them do not realize that
they exist or understand their impact.”).
15 See infra Part III; Aparicio, supra note 5, at 398 (highlighting that the emergence of the
gig economy “has sparked . . . litigation as gig economy workers bring wage and hour claims”
against companies); see also Capriole v. Uber Techs., Inc., 7 F.4th 854, 858 (9th Cir. 2021)
(“Disputes are inevitable given the differences between employees and independent
contractors, and many gig-economy workers have unsurprisingly attempted to legally
challenge their current classification.”).
16 See infra Section II.A.
17 See infra Part III.
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or interstate commerce,”18 which the U.S. Supreme Court has
ambiguously classified as “transportation workers.”19
Without guidance from either the statutory language or Supreme
Court jurisprudence, it is unclear which workers are
“transportation workers” for purposes of the Section 1 exemption.20
The influx of these suits forces lower courts to determine whether
gig economy drivers are transportation workers under Section 1 of
the FAA; if so, Section 1 would exempt them from mandatory
arbitration.21 A recent circuit split involving a range of gig-based
companies and their drivers considers whether gig economy drivers
are transportation workers “engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce,” thereby exempting these drivers from having to
arbitrate their claims.22 Recent cases illustrate that courts diverge
widely in their treatment of gig economy drivers based on a variety
of Section 1 interpretations.23 The Supreme Court has declined to
rule on this issue,24 which will invariably result in lower courts
furthering the patchwork of interpretations.
This Note argues that a narrow interpretation of the Section 1
exemption is the appropriate reading, under which gig economy
delivery drivers are not entitled to the arbitration exemption. Part
II examines the contours of the FAA, Section 1, and the recent
extension of Section 1 to employment disputes within the scope of
Supreme Court caselaw. Part III surveys the current circuit split
and the varied approaches taken by three circuit courts of appeals.
Part IV then illustrates why the Section 1 exemption should not
extend to gig economy delivery drivers and offers a defense of
arbitration in employment dispute contexts.

9 U.S.C. § 1.
See Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (holding that transportation
workers are exempt from Section 1 of the FAA).
20 See infra Part III.
21 See infra Part III.
22 9 U.S.C. § 1; see infra Part III.
23 See Aparicio, supra note 5, at 401 (stating that because the Supreme Court has never
defined who a transportation worker is, nor has it provided a framework to help resolve the
question, state and federal courts have been inconsistent and often implement “flawed legal
frameworks”).
24 Amazon.com, Inc. v. Rittmann, 141 S. Ct. 1374 (2021) (denying Amazon.com, Inc.’s
petition for writ of certiorari).
18
19
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II. BACKGROUND: THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms, including
arbitration, mediation, and negotiation, operate as a substitute for
litigation by offering an efficient and effective means to resolve
disputes between parties.25 Arbitration exists as one ADR
mechanism and is defined as follows:
[A]rbitration is an adjudicatory method of private,
third-party dispute resolution. It is an alternative to
adjudication in the courts, on the one hand, and to selfhelp, negotiated settlements, and mediation on the
other. It depends upon and can be controlled in large
measure by agreement between the parties. Arbitration
is currently facilitated by strong legislative policies
favoring enforcement of the agreement and finality of
the award. It is, in short, a favorite of the law at a time
when interest in alternative dispute resolution is high.26
Arbitration contains three basic elements: (1) parties’ agreement
to arbitrate a dispute; (2) parties’ selection of a dispute resolution
method with the intent to reduce time and cost in rendering a fair
decision by a neutral third party; and (3) an award or decision that
is final.27 The FAA governs the majority of consensual arbitral
agreements in the United States.28 The FAA applies broadly to
written contracts involving an agreement to settle disputes by
arbitration:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a
contract
evidencing
a
transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any
part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to
25 See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION—NATIONALIZATION—
INTERNATIONALIZATION 5, 15–24 (1992) (detailing ADR mechanisms that are “generally
vastly more efficient and effective than are State dispute resolution processes”).
26 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 13, § 2.1.3.
27 Id. § 2.1.1.
28 Id. § 1.1.1.
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arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.29
While Section 2 illustrates the FAA’s broad reach, Section 1
serves to limit its scope by providing an exemption to certain classes
of workers.30 Section 1 states that “nothing herein contained shall
apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or
any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce.”31 Commentators and courts agree that
Section 1 is ambiguous, particularly because the statutory language
does not articulate which workers fall under the umbrella of “any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,”32
nor is it clear whether the exemption extends to employment
contract disputes.33 As gig economy drivers push to litigate, rather
than arbitrate, claims against platform companies, questions arise
regarding whether these drivers are exempt under the Section 1
carveout as a class of workers engaged in interstate commerce and
whether the “engaged in” interstate commerce language requires
such a class to cross state lines.34

9 U.S.C. § 2.
Id. § 1.
31 Id. (emphasis added).
32 Id.
33 See MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 13, § 11.2.3 (“The exclusionary language is imprecise;
the legislative history has been described as ‘vague and inconclusive.’” (quoting Signal-Stat
Corp. v. Loc. 475, UEW, 235 F.2d 298, 302 (2d Cir. 1956), overruled by Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
of N.Y., Inc. v. Soft Drink & Brewery Workers Union Loc. 812, 242 F.3d 52 (2001))); see also
Jay E. Grenig, Evolution of the Role of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Resolving
Employment Disputes, 71 DISP. RESOL. J. 99, 109–10 (2016) (highlighting that “[t]he scope of
the Section 1 exemption has been the subject of considerable debate since its enactment,”
particularly regarding the question of whether it extends to labor disputes).
34 See infra Part III.
29
30
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A. HISTORY OF THE FAA

As a dispute resolution mechanism, arbitration has historically
been viewed favorably in commercial settings.35 In the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, New York served as the United
States’ center of arbitration, where legislative support for the
practice led to the creation of a prominent state arbitration statute
and a Court of Arbitration.36 Statutory and common law from this
period demonstrate favorable views toward arbitration in the
United States,37 but existing laws were flawed because they lacked
mechanisms to enforce arbitration agreements.38 Charles L.
Bernheimer, an arbitration scholar, and Julius Henry Cohen,
general counsel of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New
York, spearheaded a reform movement to modernize arbitration in
New York as “part of a broader package of legal simplification and
responsiveness to commercial needs in general and avoidance of
litigation in particular.”39
The 1920 New York Act followed, which provided that a “written
contract to settle a controversy thereafter arising was valid,
enforceable, and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or equity for the revocation of any contract.”40 The New York

See MACNEIL, supra note 25, at 15–24 (detailing premodern arbitration law in the United
States); MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 13, § 4.3.1 (discussing arbitration practice and law before
1800 in the United States, specifically its use in community dispute settlement in Connecticut
in the seventeenth century and its expansion into the commercial world of New York).
36 See MACNEIL, supra note 25, at 25–26 (detailing “New York’s history of institutional and
legal reinforcement of arbitration” through the creation of various arbitral courts and its
history as an arbitration hub for financial and trade associations).
37 See id. at 19 (detailing how the common law and Illinois Statute of 1873 demonstrate
positive notions toward arbitration in the United States).
38 See id. at 20 (“[A]n [arbitration] agreement did not bar a party from breaching it and
bringing a judicial action or suit on the cause giving rise to the dispute. The court would not
stay such an action or suit pending arbitration.”).
39 Id. at 28–29; see also Pamela K. Bookman, The Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, 72 VAND.
L. REV. 1119, 1134 (2019) (describing Cohen and Bernheimer as the FAA’s “lead proponents”
who argued arbitration would “make the disposition of business in the commercial world less
expensive, faster, and more just” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Christopher R.
Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265, 302 (2015))).
40 MACNEIL, supra note 25, at 35; see also MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 13, § 8.1 (detailing
how the New York act’s success prompted reformers to push for a federal act).
35

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol56/iss1/6

10

Herzberger: The Gig Economy’s Short Reach

2021]

THE GIG ECONOMY’S SHORT REACH

309

arbitration law was limited to commercial arbitration decisions.41 In
the wake of the New York arbitration law and heightened
enthusiasm towards commercial arbitration, Congress enacted the
FAA in 1925 “to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to
arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law
and had been adopted by American courts.”42 The fourteen original
sections of the statute, taken together,43 codified three issues that
arbitration aims to solve: (1) the long delay usually found in legal
proceedings due to congested court calendars and preliminary
motions and appeals that draw out consideration of a case’s merits;
(2) litigation expense; and (3) litigation’s failure to reach a just
decision in business dealings.44 In the decades that followed, the
U.S. Supreme Court helped the reformers achieve their goal of
promoting the efficacy of arbitration through the FAA.45 In a
handful of cases, the Court solidified its pro-arbitration stance and
indicated its support for the prevailing view of the FAA as “a
substantive statute regulating all interstate commercial disputes.”46
B. EXTENSION TO EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES

More recently, the pro-arbitration developments of the twentieth
century continued to shape the American arbitration system as
courts extended the FAA’s application beyond its original

41 See Bruce L. Benson, An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the
Development of Arbitration in the United States, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 479, 494 (1995) (stating
that prior to the enactment of the New York arbitration law, the New York Bar Association
lobbied to establish “statutory backing of commercial arbitration decisions”).
42 1 MARTIN DOMKE, GABRIEL WILNER & LARRY E. EDMONSON, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION § 7:5 (2021).
43 See MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 13, § 9.3 (emphasizing that the FAA “is unitary, not a
series of independent fragments . . . ‘each section of an act is to be construed with every other
section and all sections are to be considered parts of a connected whole, and harmonized, if
possible, so as to give effect to the intention of the lawmakers’” (quoting Zip Mfg. Co. v. Pep
Mfg. Co., 44 F.2d 184, 185 (D. Del. 1930))).
44 See Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA.
L. REV. 265, 269 (1926) (describing the ends that arbitration is meant to achieve).
45 See Martin H. Malin, The Three Phases of the Supreme Court’s Arbitration
Jurisprudence: Empowering the Already-Empowered, 17 NEV. L.J. 23, 27–39 (2016)
(describing how the Supreme Court’s decisions over the past century encouraged the use of
arbitration).
46 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 13, §14.1 n.1.
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commercial dispute roots to employment agreements.47 Although
one could argue that “the purpose of the FAA was to provide for the
enforceability in federal courts of arbitration agreements between
merchants,”48 the U.S. Supreme Court definitively extended the
FAA to employment disputes despite initial judicial hostility toward
expanding the FAA’s reach beyond the commercial context.49
The non-arbitrability doctrine initially checked arbitration
arising from employment disputes based on statutory claims.50 The
non-arbitrability doctrine dictates “that some matters so
pervasively involve ‘public’ rights and concerns, or interests of third
parties, that agreements to resolve such disputes by ‘private’
arbitration should not be given effect.”51 The Supreme Court’s 1953
decision in Wilko v. Swan exemplified this application of the nonarbitrability doctrine when the Court invalidated the use of
arbitration to resolve federal statutory claims.52 This trend
continued through the 1960s, when the Court applied the non-

47 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991) (“Mere inequality in
bargaining power, however, is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are
never enforceable in the employment context.”); see also MACNEIL, supra note 25, at 138–47
(explaining how two late twentieth-century cases, Prima Paint and Southland, expanded the
Court’s pro-arbitration stance). Employment dispute arbitration is arbitration between
employers and individual employees, as opposed to labor arbitration, which arises from
union-employer agreements. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Labor and Employment Arbitration
Today: Mid-Life Crisis or New Golden Age?, 32 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 2–3 (2017)
(discussing differences between labor and employment arbitration). This Note focuses on
employment arbitration, rather than labor arbitration.
48 Margaret L. Moses, Arbitration of Worker Contracts: New Prime’s Proper Statutory
Interpretation of the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act, 21 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 415, 422
(2020).
49 See Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption,
Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 476–77
(noting that “old judicial hostility persisted” until 1967 when the Court began shifting its
stance on arbitration and expanding the FAA’s scope to include employment disputes arising
under federal statutory law).
50 See Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration and Article III, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1189, 1192 (2008)
(“[T]hrough the 1960s, the non-arbitrability doctrine prevented arbitrators from resolving
issues of federal statutory law.”).
51 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 6.01, at 1029 (3d ed. 2021).
52 See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953) (“When the security buyer, prior to any
violation of the Securities Act, waives his right to sue in courts, he gives up more than would
a participant in other business transactions.”), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol56/iss1/6

12

Herzberger: The Gig Economy’s Short Reach

2021]

THE GIG ECONOMY’S SHORT REACH

311

arbitrability doctrine to render claims under newly enacted federal
employment discrimination laws non-arbitrable.53
Through a series of cases over several decades, the U.S. Supreme
Court broadened the FAA’s application beyond solely commercial
disputes, thus removing the non-arbitrability doctrine from federal
statutory claims.54 Beginning in 1974 with Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co.,55 followed by Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc.56 in 1985, the Court expanded the FAA’s reach from
purely commercial contexts to federal antitrust and securities laws
in international contexts.57 Affirming its earlier decision in
Scherk,58 in which the Court ruled that international disputes
involving securities law claims can be subject to arbitration,59 the
Mitsubishi Court reasoned that “we are well past the time when
judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the
competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of
arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution.”60 The
Court’s willingness to expand its pro-arbitration policy beyond
international contexts to the domestic sphere came in 1987 with

53 See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56 (1974) (“Arbitral procedures,
while well suited to the resolution of contractual disputes, make arbitration a comparatively
inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights created by Title VII.”).
54 See MACNEIL, supra note 25, at 57 (“[T]he immense progress of labor arbitration during
and after the New Deal years undoubtedly played a significant role in the success of the
movement to reform commercial arbitration.”); see also Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983) (“[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be
addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration. . . . The [FAA]
establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration . . . .”).
55 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
56 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
57 See, e.g., R. James Filiault, Comment, Enforcing Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in
Employment Contracts: A Common Sense Approach to the Federal Arbitration Act’s Section 1
Exclusion, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 559, 562–70 (1996) (providing an overview of relevant
Supreme Court caselaw).
58 See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 631 (“Scherk establish[ed] a strong presumption in favor of
enforcement of freely negotiated contractual choice-of-forum provisions. Here, as in Scherk,
that presumption is reinforced by the emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute
resolution.”).
59 See id. at 621 (“[I]n [Scherk] this Court ordered arbitration, pursuant to a provision
embodied in an international agreement, of a claim arising under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 . . . .”).
60 Id. at 626–27.
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Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon.61 There, the Court
found that, “[a]lthough the holding in [Scherk] was limited to
international agreements, the competence of arbitral tribunals to
resolve [securities] claims is the same in both [domestic and
international] settings.”62
In 1991, the Court formally extended the FAA to employment
disputes in a landmark case, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.63 There, the Court found that the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) did not preclude arbitration as a valid
dispute resolution mechanism.64 Shutting down criticism that
arbitration is not an appropriate mechanism for employment
disputes, the Court reasoned that the “[m]ere inequality in
bargaining power [between employers and employees] . . . is not a
sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never
enforceable in the employment context.”65 Relying on its precedent
in Mitsubishi, the Gilmer Court found that, even in relationships
where there may be unequal bargaining power between the parties,
an arbitration agreement was enforceable because “the FAA’s
purpose was to place arbitration agreements on the same footing as
other contracts. Thus, arbitration agreements are enforceable ‘save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.’”66 The Court established that arbitration agreements
in employment contexts can be upheld unless the arbitration
agreement resulted from a “sort of fraud or overwhelming economic
power that would provide grounds ‘for the revocation of any

482 U.S. 220 (1987).
Id. at 232. The Court reasoned that “the mistrust of arbitration that formed the basis for
the Wilko opinion in 1953 is difficult to square with the assessment of arbitration that has
prevailed since that time.” Id. at 233. The Court officially overruled Wilko in Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989), finding that “Wilko was
incorrectly decided,” especially in light of the steady erosion of judicial hostility towards
arbitration. Id. at 480, 484.
63 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (“It is by now clear that statutory claims may be the subject of an
arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA.”).
64 Id. at 29 (“Congress, however, did not explicitly preclude arbitration or other nonjudicial
resolution of claims, even in its recent amendments to the ADEA.”).
65 Id. at 33.
66 Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).
61
62
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contract.’”67 As such, Gilmer formally opened the door for the FAA
to reach employment disputes.68
C. PIVOTAL CASES: CIRCUIT CITY AND NEW PRIME

Since Gilmer, the U.S. Supreme Court has decided two
employment contract dispute cases involving the scope of the
Section 1 exemption.69 First, in its 2001 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams decision, the Court limited the Section 1 exemption to
transportation workers’ employment agreements specifically,
rather than to all employment agreements.70 In that case, a Circuit
City employee filed an employment discrimination suit against the
company under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act in
contravention of his employment agreement’s requirement to
arbitrate all disputes.71 In the decision below, the Ninth Circuit
ruled that all employment contracts were excluded from the FAA,
creating a circuit split that prompted the U.S. Supreme Court to
grant certiorari to resolve the issue of the exemption’s applicability
in employment contracts.72 In line with decades’ worth of proarbitration decisions,73 the Court held that “Section 1 exempts from
the FAA only contracts of employment of transportation workers.”74
To reach this ruling, the Court applied a narrow interpretative
67 Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627
(1985)).
68 See William B. Gould IV, Kissing Cousins?: The Federal Arbitration Act and Modern
Labor Arbitration, 55 EMORY L.J. 609, 615 (2006) (“[T]he Supreme Court gave the signal in
its landmark Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. decision that it was federal labor policy
to promote arbitration of statutory issues and that arbitration could provide an adequate
substitute for litigation.” (footnote omitted)).
69 Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S.
Ct. 532 (2019).
70 Cir. City, 532 U.S. at 109 (“We now decide that the better interpretation is to construe
the statute . . . to confine the exemption to transportation workers.”).
71 Id. at 109–10.
72 Id. at 109 (“All but one of the Courts of Appeals which have addressed the issue interpret
this provision as exempting contracts of employment of transportation workers, but not other
employment contracts, from the FAA’s coverage.”).
73 Id. at 123 (stating that “[t]he Court has been quite specific in holding that arbitration
agreements can be enforced under the FAA without contravening the policies of congressional
enactments giving employees specific protection against discrimination prohibited by federal
law”).
74 Id. at 119.
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framework to Section 1 that examined the plain meaning of the
statutory text, the statute’s structure, and the statute’s purpose.75
The Court employed a textual reading of Section 1 to reach its
conclusion.76 In analyzing the Section 1 phrase “engaged in
commerce,” the Court determined that Congress intended for this
language to have a “limited reach” by comparing Section 1 to Section
2, which uses the broader phrase “involving commerce.”77 The Court
found that the “plain meaning of the words ‘engaged in commerce’
is narrower than the more open-ended formulations ‘affecting
commerce’ and ‘involving commerce.’”78 The “engaged in commerce”
language, the Court reasoned, denotes “persons or activities within
the flow of interstate commerce,”79 whereas “affecting commerce,”
like “involving commerce,” signals Congress’s intent to fully exercise
its commerce power.80 Because Congress applies “different
modifiers to the word ‘commerce’ in the design and enactment of its
statutes,”81 the deliberate use of “engaged in” indicates a narrow
interpretation not “subject to variable interpretations depending
upon the date of adoption.”82 The Court expressly disregarded the
argument that the phrase “engaged in commerce” should be read in
a different manner—namely, one that would emphasize the fact
that “‘engaged in commerce’ was not a term of art indicating a
limited assertion of congressional jurisdiction” at the time of the
FAA’s enactment.83 The Court stated that this alternative reading
would result in “[a] variable standard for interpreting common,
jurisdictional phrases [that] would contradict [the Court’s] earlier
cases and bring instability to statutory interpretation.”84

Id. at 118 (“The plain meaning of the words ‘engaged in commerce’ is narrower than the
more open-ended formulations ‘affecting commerce’ and ‘involving commerce.’ . . . We must,
of course, construe the ‘engaged in commerce’ language in the FAA with reference to the
statutory context in which it is found and in a manner consistent with the FAA’s purpose.”).
76 See Claire Kennedy-Wilkins, Note, Playing Ostrich with the FAA’s History: The Scope of
Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Contracts, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1593, 1594 (2003) (“[T]he
Court in Circuit City based its decision on a textual analysis of Section 1 . . . .”).
77 Cir. City, 532 U.S. at 115.
78 Id. at 118.
79 Id. (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974)).
80 Id. at 115.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 117.
83 Id. at 116.
84 Id. at 117.
75
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The Court also applied the maxim ejusdem generis—a “statutory
canon that ‘[w]here general words follow specific words in a
statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace
only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the
preceding specific words’”—to the Section 1 phrase “any other class
of workers engaged in . . . commerce.”85 This construction suggests
that the phrase is residual because it follows an explicit reference
to “seamen” and “railroad employees”; therefore, “any other class of
workers” should be “controlled and defined by reference to the
enumerated categories of workers which are recited just before it.”86
The Court acknowledged that canons of construction can generally
be countered, but “[t]he application of the rule ejusdem generis in
this case, however, is in full accord with other sound considerations
bearing upon the proper interpretation” of Section 1.87
Finally, the Court examined the purpose of the FAA to emphasize
the need for a narrow reading of Section 1.88 In asserting that
“engaged in commerce” has a limited reach, the Court reasoned that
this language must be construed “with reference to the statutory
context in which it is found and in a manner consistent with the
FAA’s purpose.”89 The Court reiterated that the FAA “seeks broadly
to overcome judicial hostility to arbitration.”90 Thus, the statute
counsels in favor of a reading that upholds such purpose.91 The
Court promulgated a narrow interpretation of the Section 1
exemption, “making the FAA a vehicle for the enforcement of most
employment arbitration agreements.”92 The Court explicitly
minimized the influence that historical arguments and legislative
history have on its interpretation of Section 1, particularly because

85 Id. at 114–15 (quoting 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 47.17 (1991)).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 115.
88 Id. at 118.
89 Id.
90 Id. (quoting Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995)).
91 See id. at 118–19 (explaining that the Court lacked any basis to go beyond the text to
interpret the statute broadly).
92 Dennis R. Nolan, Employment Arbitration After Circuit City, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 853, 853
(2003).
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the sparse legislative record on the exemption does not provide
information on the provision’s meaning.93
Eighteen years after Circuit City, the Court again examined the
scope of Section 1 in New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira.94 There, the Court
determined that the term “contracts of employment” under Section
1 extended not only to formal employees, but also to independent
contractors.95 The case involved an interstate trucking company
that classified a long-haul driver as an independent contractor
rather than an employee, raising the question of whether the
arbitration clause in his employment agreement was valid in light
of this classification.96
The Court applied a textual analysis to determine the scope of
the phrase “contract of employment.”97 First, the Court reasoned
that it is a fundamental statutory construction canon to interpret
words in a statute by their ordinary meaning at the time enacted by
Congress.98 Turning to what “contract of employment” meant at the
time of the FAA’s enaction in 1925, the Court examined legal and
popular dictionaries to determine that “employment” had a broad
definition, serving as a synonym for “work.”99 The Court also
determined that early twentieth-century Supreme Court caselaw
used the phrase “contract of employment” for independent
contractor agreements.100 The Court then examined the use of the
term “workers” in Section 1 and concluded that Congress

93 See Cir. City, 532 U.S. at 119 (“While the historical arguments respecting Congress’
understanding of its power in 1925 are not insubstantial, this fact alone does not give us basis
to adopt . . . an expansive construction of the FAA’s exclusion provision that goes beyond the
meaning of the words Congress used.”).
94 139 S. Ct. 532 (2019).
95 See id. at 542–44 (reasoning that “[w]hen Congress enacted the [FAA] in 1925, the term
‘contracts of employment’ referred to agreements to perform work,” and thus includes
independent contractors within its scope).
96 Id. at 536. The Court stated that both parties conceded that Mr. Oliveira qualified as a
worker engaged in interstate commerce due to the nature of his trucking position. Id. at 539.
97 See id. at 539–41 (analyzing the text of the statute itself because the statute did not
provide the Court with any reason “to depart from the original meaning of the statute at
hand”).
98 Id. at 539 (applying the “fundamental canon of statutory construction” that requires
finding a text’s original public meaning (quoting Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
2067, 2074 (2018))).
99 Id. at 539–40.
100 Id. at 540.
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deliberately chose that broad term over “employees” or “servants” to
indicate that the term “easily embraces independent contractors.”101
The Court’s decisions in Circuit City and New Prime resolved
several important questions about certain aspects of the Section 1
exemption—namely, that transportation workers are those workers
“engaged in interstate commerce”102 and that the Section 1
exemption applies to independent contractors.103 Although
independent contractors are now exempt if they are engaged in
interstate commerce, the Court did not determine who qualifies as
a “transportation worker.”104 Additionally, neither case elaborated
how closely related a worker’s employment industry must be to a
transportation sector or how closely related the employee’s
responsibilities must be to interstate commerce.105 As a result, lower
courts apply the exemption inconsistently in suits involving gig
economy delivery drivers.106

III. CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT
Several circuit courts of appeals have considered whether
employment contracts of certain delivery workers—those locally
transporting goods, meals, and, in some cases, people—are exempt
from arbitration under the FAA’s Section 1 carveout for
transportation workers.107 These courts take one of two general
approaches to determine whether the Section 1 exemption for
transportation workers applies to gig economy drivers, with each
Id. at 541.
See Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (“We now decide that the
better interpretation is to construe the statute, as most of the Courts of Appeals have done,
to confine the exemption to transportation workers.”).
103 See New Prime, 139 S. Ct. at 543–44 (holding that independent contractor employment
agreements fall within the Section 1 arbitration exception).
104 See Stephanie Greene & Christine Neylon O’Brien, New Battles and Battlegrounds for
Mandatory Arbitration After Epic Systems, New Prime, and Lamps Plus, 56 AM. BUS. L.J.
815, 860 (2019) (noting that the Court failed to explain who a “transportation worker” is in
its FAA decisions).
105 See Aparicio, supra note 5, at 408 (“[T]he Supreme Court has yet to shed light on the
classes of workers it considers to be ‘transportation workers.’”).
106 See id. at 409 (stating that because the Supreme Court has never defined
“transportation worker,” lower courts have “come up with varying, inconsistent, and often
times flawed legal frameworks” when applying this provision); see, e.g., id. at 427–29
(providing examples of conflicting caselaw as applied to Amazon Flex drivers).
107 See infra Sections III.A, III.B.
101
102
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analysis turning on whether the workers must cross state lines to
be “engaged in interstate commerce.”108 One approach employs a
broad reading of the phrase that does not require these drivers to
cross state lines to be deemed “engaged in” interstate commerce,109
while a second approach promotes a narrow reading that denies
delivery drivers the exemption because the drivers themselves do
not cross state lines.110
A. BROAD APPROACH

In near-identical cases, the Courts of Appeals for the First
Circuit in Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc.111 and the Ninth Circuit in
Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc.112 found that the Section 1
arbitration exemption applies to gig economy drivers who transport
goods or people intrastate.113 Both courts interpreted the exemption
broadly, concluding that drivers do not need to cross state lines
because the nature of their employment is “so closely related” to

108 Compare, e.g., Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 904, 910 (9th Cir. 2020) (“The
plain meaning of the relevant statutory text, case law interpreting the exemption’s scope and
application, and the construction of similar statutory language all support the conclusion that
transportation workers need not cross state lines to be considered ‘engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce’ pursuant to § 1.”), with Wallace v. Grubhub Holdings, Inc., 970 F.3d
798, 801–02 (7th Cir. 2020) (“To determine whether a class of workers meets [the
transportation worker] definition, we consider whether the interstate movement of goods is
a central part of the class members’ job description. . . . Then, if such a class exists, we ask in
turn whether the plaintiff is a member of it.”).
109 See infra Section IV.A.
110 See infra Section III.B.
111 966 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2020).
112 971 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2020).
113 See Waithaka, 966 F.3d at 13 (“[W]e now hold that the exemption encompasses the
contracts of transportation workers who transport goods or people within the flow of
interstate commerce, not simply those who physically cross state lines in the course of their
work.”); Rittmann, 971 F.3d at 907 (“AmFlex delivery providers fall within the scope of the
FAA’s transportation worker exemption pursuant to § 1 because they deliver goods shipped
from across the United States.”). But see Capriole v. Uber Techs., Inc., 7 F.4th 854, 863 (9th
Cir. 2021) (“We conclude that Uber drivers, as a nationwide ‘class of workers,’ are not
‘engaged in foreign or interstate commerce’ and are therefore not exempt from arbitration
under the FAA.” (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 1)). In Capriole, id. at 864–65, the Ninth Circuit found
“that Uber’s service is primarily local and intrastate in nature,” so interstate movement is
not a central part of Uber drivers’ occupation.
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interstate transportation as to practically be in it.114 These courts
turned to Supreme Court precedent interpreting the exemption’s
scope and application, the plain meaning of the statutory text,
contemporaneous caselaw and statutes, and the specific factual
contexts of the businesses involved to support the conclusion that
drivers do not need to cross state lines to be considered engaged in
interstate commerce under Section 1.115
1. Contemporaneous Caselaw and Statutes. The First Circuit
acknowledged Circuit City’s narrow statutory interpretive approach
in its Waithaka decision but found that New Prime “supplemented
the interpretive guidance of Circuit City by instructing that we must
interpret the Section 1 exemption according to the ‘fundamental
canon of statutory construction that words generally should be
interpreted as taking their ordinary . . . meaning . . . at the time’” of
enactment.116 According to the First Circuit, this canon requires
interpreting contemporaneous statutes, which suggested that the
phrase “engaged in” does not require drivers to cross state lines to
be “engaged in commerce.”117
To that end, the court in Waithaka stated that the Circuit City
Court relied on the interpretation of the phrase “engaged in
commerce” in contemporaneously enacted statutes, including the
1914 Clayton Act, because a comparative analysis of the language
would aid the court in assessing “the meaning of the words in the
exemption when written.”118 The court used this mechanism as an
invitation to compare the “engaged in” language of the FAA to that
of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), which states that
114 Rittmann, 971 F.3d at 911 (quoting Palcko v. Airborne Express, Inc., 372 F.3d 588, 593
(3d Cir. 2004)).
115 See Waithaka, 966 F.3d at 13, 22 (examining the “text and purpose of the statute and
the relevant precedent” and determining that “[t]he nature of the business for which a class
of workers perform their activities must inform th[e] assessment” of whether a class is
engaged in interstate commerce); Rittmann, 971 F.3d at 909–15 (interpreting the phrase
“engaged in interstate or foreign commerce” by turning to Circuit City’s precedent, parsing
the ordinary meaning of the term “commerce,” and assessing the use of the phrase “engaged
in commerce” in contemporaneous statutes).
116 Waithaka, 966 F.3d at 17 (alterations in original) (quoting New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira,
139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019)).
117 Id. at 18–22.
118 Id. at 18–19 (citing Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 117–19 (2001)). The
Clayton Act defines “commerce” as “trade or commerce among the several States and with
foreign nations, or between the District of Columbia or any Territory of the United States and
any State, Territory, or foreign nation . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 12.
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“[e]very common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce
between any of the several States . . . shall be liable in damages to
any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in
such commerce.”119 The court also found that cases interpreting the
scope of the FELA’s “engaged in commerce” language support a
parallel application to the FAA because “these cases show that
workers moving goods or people destined for, or coming from, other
states—even if the workers were responsible only for an intrastate
leg of that interstate journey—were understood to be ‘engaged in
interstate commerce’ in 1925.”120 The Ninth Circuit in Rittmann
also turned to cases decided around the time of the FAA’s enactment
to discount the argument that a transportation worker must cross
state lines to be exempt from Section 1 because those cases did not
interpret the phrase as requiring workers to cross state lines for the
exemption to apply.121
2. Textual Reading. The Waithaka court’s textual reading of
Section 1’s residual clause focuses on the “nature of the business for
which a class of workers perform their activities” to determine
whether a class of workers is engaged in interstate commerce.122
The court stated that the drivers “carry out the objectives of a
business, which may or may not involve the movement of ‘persons
or activities within the flow of interstate commerce,’—the crucial
concept reflected in the FELA precedents.”123 The court asserted
that considering the nature of the business is consistent with the
ejusdem generis canon invoked in Circuit City because the
enumerated groups of “seamen” and “railroad employees” in Section
1 are “defined by the nature of the business for which they work,
demonstrat[ing] that the activities of a company are relevant in
determining the applicability of the FAA exemption to other classes
of workers.”124

Id. at 19 (alteration in original) (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 51).
Id. at 22.
121 See Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 904, 912 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[C]ourts
interpreting FELA have held that workers were employed in interstate commerce even when
they did not cross state lines.”).
122 Waithaka, 966 F.3d at 22–23.
123 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Cir. City, 532 U.S. at 118).
124 Id. at 23; see also Rittmann, 971 F.3d at 918 (“Amazon’s business includes not just the
selling of goods, but also the delivery of those goods, typically undertaken by those businesses
we have considered to be engaged in foreign and interstate commerce . . . .”).
119
120
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The Ninth Circuit echoed this approach in Rittmann,
highlighting the importance of considering the nature of the
employee’s business.125 The majority in Rittmann found that
Amazon Flex delivery drivers are a class of workers engaged in
interstate commerce because “the Amazon packages they carry are
goods that remain in the stream of interstate commerce until they
are delivered.”126 The Ninth Circuit examined a 1909 definition of
“engaged” and a 1910 definition of “commerce” and found that the
combined terms “can reasonably be read to include workers
employed to transport goods that are shipped across state lines.”127
The court read this combined definition broadly to mean that it
applies equally to one worker delivering goods that originated outof-state and to another delivering goods that originated in-state.128
Finally, both courts dismissed the weight of the FAA’s proarbitration purpose, finding that its “pro-arbitration purpose cannot
override the original meaning of the statute’s text”129 and that
“[n]othing in Circuit City requires that we rely on the proarbitration purpose reflected in § 2 to even further limit the already
narrow definition of the phrase ‘engaged in commerce.’”130
B. NARROW APPROACH

In Wallace v. GrubHub Holdings, Inc.,131 the Seventh Circuit
instituted a narrow approach that denies extending the Section 1
exemption to intrastate delivery drivers, finding that this group
Rittmann, 971 F.3d at 917.
Id. at 915. The court distinguished Amazon Flex delivery drivers from food delivery
services based on the fact that “local food delivery drivers are not ‘engaged in the interstate
transport of goods’ because the prepared meals from local restaurants are not a type of good
that are ‘indisputably part of the stream of commerce.’” Id. at 916 (quoting Levin v. Caviar,
Inc., 146 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2015)). The court emphasized that Amazon’s
products “do not ‘come to rest’” when they reach a warehouse; therefore, the interstate
transaction does not end at the warehouse. Id. Rather, products arriving at a warehouse are
still in the interstate process, which concludes when a last-mile driver delivers them to a
customer’s intended destination. Id.
127 Id. at 910.
128 See id. (“The ordinary meaning of those words does not suggest that a worker employed
to deliver goods that originate out-of-state to an in-state destination is not ‘engaged in
commerce’ any less than a worker tasked with delivering goods between states.”).
129 Waithaka, 966 F.3d at 24.
130 Rittmann, 971 F.3d at 914.
131 970 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 2020).
125
126
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does not qualify as a class of transportation workers engaged in
interstate commerce.132 Under this line of reasoning, the operative
unit of the residual phrase is “class of workers,” rendering whether
the individual worker actually engaged in interstate commerce
irrelevant.133 Rather, it is relevant “whether the class of workers to
which the complaining worker belonged engaged in interstate
commerce.”134 Under this approach, a class of workers is exempt
from arbitration when it is “actually engaged in the movement of
goods in interstate commerce,”135 or stated differently, when a class
of workers is “connected not simply to the goods, but to the act of
moving those goods across state or national borders.”136
The Seventh Circuit’s statutory interpretation began by
examining the text, which suggests that “the first thing we see in
the text of the residual category is that the operative unit is a ‘class
of workers.’”137 This reading indicates that a transportation
workers’ class member qualifies for the Section 1 exemption when
her class engages in interstate commerce.138 To determine what it
means for a class of workers to be engaged in interstate commerce,
the Seventh Circuit relied on Circuit City’s narrow reading of the
“engaged in” language used in Section 1 rather than the “involving
commerce” language used in Section 2.139
Courts employ a two-part test to determine if a class meets the
“engaged in interstate commerce” requirement.140 First, the court
considers “whether the interstate movement of goods is a central
part of the class members’ job description,” which becomes the

See id. at 803 (“To show that they fall within this exception, the plaintiffs had to
demonstrate that the interstate movement of goods is a central part of the job description of
the class of workers to which they belong.”).
133 Id. at 802–03.
134 Id. at 800 (quoting Bacashihua v. U.S. Postal Serv., 859 F.2d 402, 405 (6th Cir. 1988)).
135 Id. at 801 (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Loc. Union No. 50 v. Kienstra Precast, LLC,
702 F.3d 954, 956 (7th Cir. 2012)).
136 Id. at 802.
137 Id. at 800.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 800–01.
140 See id. at 801–02 (explaining that circuit courts of appeals first consider whether the
relevant job description puts a class of workers within the group of “transportation workers”
sufficiently engaged in interstate commerce then turn to whether the plaintiff is a part of
that class).
132
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central question in the analysis.141 If a court finds that the
interstate movement of goods is a central part of the class’s job
description, then the question becomes whether the individual
worker belongs to that class.142 Using this framework, the Wallace
court determined that drivers for Grubhub, a mobile food-ordering
platform, are not exempt from arbitration because it is not enough
that the drivers are connected only to the goods; rather, the drivers
must be connected to cross-border movement of those goods to
qualify for the interstate commerce exemption.143
The governing framework provided by Circuit City serves as the
basis for this line of reasoning, which focuses on whether a worker
is a member of a class of workers that is actively engaged in the
“movement of goods across interstate lines.”144 This narrow
approach requires that the employee herself be “engaged in the
channels of foreign or interstate commerce,”145 making the
“transportation worker” category “analogous to that of seamen and
railroad employees, whose occupations are centered on the
transport of goods in interstate or foreign commerce.”146 This
framework is also significant from a policy perspective because
applying the broad apporach over Circuit City’s narrow approach
would exempt a wide range of workers “whose occupations have
nothing to do with interstate transport” from the FAA.147

Id. at 801. The Wallace court noted caselaw that concluded that an interstate trucker is
plainly a transportation worker, while someone who occasionally delivers furniture to out-ofstate customers is not a transportation worker. Id. at 801–02 (first citing New Prime Inc. v.
Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019); and then citing Hill v. Rent-A-Center, 398 F.3d 1286,
1289–90 (11th Cir. 2005)).
142 Id. at 802. The court acknowledged that this distinction is straightforward in some
cases, as in New Prime, but it can also be difficult, as in Waithaka. Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 801–02.
145 Id. at 802 (quoting McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 573, 576 (10th Cir. 1998)).
146 Id.; see also Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 904, 921 (9th Cir. 2020) (Bress, J.,
dissenting) (stating that despite the difficulty in applying “somewhat opaque, century-old
statutory language to a technology-based convenience of modern life . . . for a delivery worker
to be ‘engaged in’ interstate commerce under the FAA, he must belong to a ‘class of workers’
that crosses state lines in the course of making deliveries”).
147 See Wallace, 970 F.3d at 802 (noting that the alternative interpretation could result in
“dry cleaners who deliver pressed shirts manufactured in Taiwan and ice cream truck drivers
selling treats made with milk from an out-of-state dairy,” for example, being exempt from the
FAA despite lacking any closer connection to interstate commerce).
141
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IV. ANALYSIS: GIG ECONOMY DELIVERY DRIVERS SHOULD NOT
RECEIVE THE SECTION 1 ARBITRATION EXEMPTION
The current circuit split highlights the difficulty in applying an
ambiguous provision of a century-old statute to the “technologybased convenience of modern life.”148 Resolving this split requires a
universal determination of whether gig economy drivers are
transportation workers exempt under Section 1 of the FAA. This
Part proposes that gig economy delivery drivers should not be
classified as transportation workers for purposes of the Section 1
arbitration exemption for legal and practical reasons.
A. LEGAL ANALYSIS

Because gig economy delivery drivers are not “seamen” or
“railroad employees,” they must fall within the embrace of “any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” to
qualify for the arbitration exemption.149 A narrow statutory reading
of the Section 1 exemption, as dictated by Circuit City, proposes that
gig economy drivers operating in a wholly intrastate context should
not be exempt from arbitration because they do not fall within the
scope of the residual phrase “class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce.”150
Although Circuit City did not define “transportation worker,”151
its narrow interpretation of Section 1 indicates that the casual
nature of gig work does not constitute a class of workers in
transportation. Under the appropriate narrow reading of Section 1,
a transportation worker must be connected to the act of moving
goods across state or national borders, rather than only tangentially
linked to a good that has traveled in interstate commerce or only
working for a company affiliated with interstate commerce.152 This
Rittmann, 971 F.3d at 921 (Bress, J., dissenting).
9 U.S.C. § 1.
150 Id.; see Wallace, 970 F.3d at 800 (“What does it mean for a class of workers to be ‘engaged
in interstate commerce’? The Supreme Court's decision in Circuit City goes a long way toward
providing an answer.”).
151 Aparicio, supra note 5, at 408.
152 See Wallace, 970 F.3d at 802 (“Whether easy or hard, though, the inquiry is always
focused on the worker’s active engagement in the enterprise of moving goods across interstate
lines.”); Rittmann, 971 F.3d at 926 (Bress, J., dissenting) (“As a matter of common parlance,
148
149
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Section proposes that such a reading is supported by a plain reading
of the statutory language, the statutory structure, and the purpose
of the FAA.
1. Misapplication of Contemporaneous Statutes. The Waithaka
court relied on New Prime to reason that it “must interpret the
Section 1 exemption according to the ‘fundamental canon of
statutory construction that words generally should be interpreted
as taking their ordinary . . . meaning . . . at the time Congress
enacted the statute.’”153 Using contemporaneous statutes as a
blueprint for statutory interpretation, the court considered the
scope of “engaged in” interstate commerce within the meaning of the
1908 FELA.154 The First Circuit in Waithaka referred to Supreme
Court cases involving the FELA in which the Court found that
workers “engaged in interstate commerce” included both “those who
transported goods or passengers that were moving interstate” and
“those who were not involved in transport themselves but were in
positions ‘so closely related’ to interstate transportation ‘as to be
practically a part of it.’”155 The Waithaka court stated that “by
looking to these FELA precedents to understand the original
meaning of the phrase in 1925, [it was] not engaging in a method of
interpretation that Circuit City forbids”156 and thus did not stray
from relevant FAA precedent.
The Waithaka court’s interpretation of the Circuit City and New
Prime framework is unconvincing, though, because neither case
mandated the use of contemporaneous statutes to determine the
ordinary meaning of Section 1 at the time Congress enacted the
FAA.157 The First Circuit correctly stated that “engaged in

and remembering Circuit City’s guidance on the narrowness of ‘engaged in,’ a ‘class’ of
delivery workers would more commonly ‘engage in’ (i.e., be employed in) ‘interstate commerce’
by transporting goods across state lines.”).
153 Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc., 966 F.3d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 2020) (alterations in original)
(quoting New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019)).
154 See id. at 18–22 (examining “the interpretation of similar phrases in statutes
contemporaneous to the FAA” to discern the proper meaning of “engaged in commerce”).
155 Id. at 20 (first citing Phila. & Reading Ry. Co. v. Hancock, 253 U.S. 284, 285–86 (1920);
and then citing Shanks v. Del., Lackawanna, & W.R.R. Co., 239 U.S. 556, 558–59 (1916)).
156 Id. at 21.
157 See Hamrick v. Partsfleet, LLC, 1 F.4th 1337, 1348 (11th Cir. 2021) (“Specifically,
in Circuit City, the Supreme Court rejected the employee’s argument that ‘engaged in
commerce’ should be interpreted the same way as other federal statutes that used the same
phrase.”).
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commerce” is a phrase that has not been interpreted “as
expansively” as Section 2’s “involving commerce,” but it incorrectly
indicated that Circuit City examined other statutory contexts to
reach this conclusion.158 To reach its holding, the Court in Circuit
City only relied on its interpretation of these phrases in AlliedBruce.159 The use of the other cases cited by the Waithaka court is
dicta and is therefore not binding.160 Moreover, a comparison of the
FAA to any other contemporaneous statute requires that the statute
share the FAA’s statutory context and purpose.161 The First Circuit
and Ninth Circuit’s reliance on the FELA, the Clayton Act, and the
Robinson-Patman Act is misplaced because these Acts do not share
the FAA’s context, text, or purpose.162
The FELA, in particular, focuses on the “common carrier,” while
“the FAA’s specific structure and phrasing,” including the
references to “seamen” and “railroad employees,” “give the [Section]

158 Waithaka, 966 F.3d at 16–17, 21 (finding that the Court used several cases to come to
this narrow reading of “engaged in”). The Circuit City Court only reflected on its past cases
involving similar statutory language to prove that it “has declined in past cases to afford
significance, in construing the meaning of the statutory jurisdictional provisions ‘in
commerce’ and ‘engaged in commerce,’ to the circumstance that the statute predated shifts in
the Court’s Commerce Clause cases.” Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 117 (2001).
159 Cir. City, 532 U.S. at 115–16 (“In Allied-Bruce itself the Court said the words ‘in
commerce’ are ‘often-found words of art’ that we have not read as expressing congressional
intent to regulate to the outer limits of authority under the Commerce Clause.” (quoting
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273 (1995))).
160 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ
STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 189 (2016) (“If an appellate court authoritatively construes
a statute, the court’s holding is binding on future courts. In contrast to dicta, the holding is
the specific application of statutory text to particular facts, together with the legal reasoning
deemed necessary to support that application.”). The Circuit City Court, 532 U.S. at 119, held
that “Section 1 exempts from the FAA only contracts of employment of transportation
workers,” and its discussion of prior caselaw was not a part of that holding; therefore, the
case discussion should not be an authoritative source for lower courts.
161 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 160, at 121 (stating that the use of other statutes to deduct
meaning in a different statute is “especially persuasive when the same term, phrase, or
provision is found in statutes that are very similar in object, purpose, and subject matter to
the one being interpreted”); see also Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 904, 931 (9th
Cir. 2020) (Bress, J., dissenting) (finding that the “FELA and the Clayton and RobinsonPatman Acts do not share the FAA’s text, ‘context,’ or ‘purpose’”).
162 See Rittmann, 971 F.3d at 931–32 (Bress, J., dissenting) (countering the Waithaka court
and the Rittmann majority opinion’s reasoning by arguing that the FELA, the Clayton Act,
and the Robinson-Patman Act cannot “overcome the more natural import of the FAA’s text,
structure, and purpose”).
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1 residual clause some of its meaning.”163 Additionally, these
contemporaneous statutes do not share the FAA’s purpose,164 nor
did the Supreme Court ever instruct for the FAA to be interpreted
in light of the FELA.165 The argument in support of using the FELA
as a blueprint for interpreting the FAA requires a broad leap from
precedent because Circuit City never mandated this as a test;
rather, its reference to the Clayton Act serves only as an example.166
Therefore, depending too heavily on the language of other statutes
may not be indicative of the drafters’ intent behind the FAA, nor is
it determinative of the statutory language.
2. Statutory Language and Structure. A textual, ordinary
meaning analysis167 of Section 1’s residual phrase “any other class
of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce”168 at the time
of the FAA’s enactment supports the proposition that a class of
workers must cross state lines to be engaged in interstate
commerce.169 Dictionaries from the time of the FAA’s enactment and
the use of the “engaged in” language in contemporaneous caselaw
support this proposition.170 Specifically, dictionaries from the time
of enactment demonstrate that the terms “engaged” and “interstate
commerce” were afforded a meaning that required crossing state
Id. at 931.
See id. at 931–32 (“The identified purposes of these other statutes are also not
comparable to the FAA’s recognized objectives.”).
165 Cf. id. at 933 (indicating that neither the majority in Rittmann nor the First Circuit in
Waithaka identified FELA cases from the first quarter of the twentieth century that involved
“last leg” delivery drivers like Amazon Flex drivers).
166 See Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118–19 (2001) (stating that, while it
looked to the prior interpretation of the language in the Clayton Act for help in interpreting
the FAA, the Court did “not mean to suggest that statutory jurisdictional formulations
‘necessarily have a uniform meaning whenever used by Congress’” (quoting United States v.
Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 277 (1975))).
167 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 160, at 33–43 (explaining that “apply[ing] the meaning that a
reasonable reader would derive from the text of the law” is a prime directive in statutory
interpretation and that “[t]he ordinary meaning rule requires that the judge provide a fair
reading of statutory language, as it would be understood by the audience for the statute”).
168 9 U.S.C. § 1.
169 See Kennedy-Wilkins, supra note 76, at 1601 (arguing that the Employers’ Liability
Cases, which required interpretation of the FELA, indicate that “at the time of the FAA’s
enactment, Congress’s power to regulate the terms and conditions of employment was
thought to be limited to circumstances where employees were actually engaged in acts of
commerce”).
170 See, e.g., Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 904, 925–26 (Bress, J., dissenting)
(surveying dictionaries from the early twentieth century).
163
164
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lines.171 Dictionaries from the early 1900s defined “engaged” as
“occupied” or “employed.”172 “Interstate commerce,” on the other
hand, was defined as “the transportation of persons or property
between or among the several states of the Union, or from or
between points in one state and points in another state.”173
The prior-construction canon also supports the idea that courts
often consider the contemporaneous understandings of statutory
terms in pre-enactment decisions when undertaking a plain
meaning analysis of those terms.174 Despite the First Circuit’s
argument that interpretations of FELA-related caselaw decided
around the time of the FAA’s enactment support the broad
approach,175 there are two cases that indicate otherwise. The
Employers’ Liability Cases of 1908176 and 1912177 demonstrate that,
around the time of the FAA’s enactment, an employee could not be
engaged in interstate commerce without crossing state lines.178
171 See id. at 926 (Bress, J., dissenting) (finding dictionaries from the early twentieth
century support the contention that, at the time Congress enacted the FAA, the terms
“engaged” and “interstate commerce” could be understood to mean “a person who is ‘engaged
in … interstate commerce’ is one who is employed to do the thing that is the subject of the
engagement, here ‘foreign or interstate commerce’”). Dictionaries are an increasingly popular
source of support in statutory interpretation. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 160, at 44
(“Increasingly, judges are turning to dictionaries as external evidence of what words might
mean.”). But see ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION
OF LEGAL TEXTS app. A at 415–16 (2012) (cautioning against the use of non-legal dictionaries
to determine statutory meaning).
172 Engaged, WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1919).
173 Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 904, 926 (9th Cir. 2020) (Bress, J., dissenting)
(quoting Interstate Commerce, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910)).
174 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 171, at 322–23 (defining the prior construction canon
and explaining that “when a statute uses the very same terminology as an earlier
statute . . . it is reasonable to believe that the terminology bears a consistent meaning”).
175 See Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc., 966 F.3d 10, 19–20 (1st Cir. 2020) (analyzing FELA
cases then settling on a broad definition of “engaged in commerce” derived from Supreme
Court precedent).
176 Howard v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 463 (1908).
177 Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
178 Howard, 207 U.S. at 499 (invalidating a statute that attempted to regulate employerworker relationships because it “includes many subjects wholly beyond the power [of
Congress] to regulate commerce, and depends for its sanction upon that authority, it results
that the act is repugnant to the Constitution”). The Howard Court found that including
wholly intrastate workers, who may work for a company that engages in interstate commerce,
would nonetheless “extend the power of Congress to every conceivable subject, however
inherently local, would obliterate all the limitations of power imposed by the Constitution,
and would destroy the authority of the states as to all conceivable matters which . . . [are]
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These cases involved the FELA, which covered “all common carriers
engaged in interstate commerce” and imposed liability on such
carriers “without qualification or restriction as to the business in
which the carriers or their employees may be engaged at the time of
the injury.”179 The First Employers’ Liability Case found that, at the
time, the FELA exceeded the scope of Congress’s commerce power
“because the law included employees who may not have been
actually engaged in commerce when they were injured.”180 The
Second Employers’ Liability Case further clarified that to be
engaged in interstate commerce required movement across state
lines, declaring the following proposition as “so firmly settled as no
longer to be open to dispute”:181
Among the instruments and agents to which the
[commerce] power extends are the railroads over which
transportation from one state to another is conducted,
the engines and cars by which such transportation is
effected, and all who are in any wise engaged in such
transportation, whether as common carriers or as their
employees.182
This reading comports with the Supreme Court’s narrow view of
the phrase “engaged in commerce” in Circuit City, where it was

under their control so long as the Constitution endures.” Id. at 502–03; see also Mondou, 207
U.S. at 48–49 (“[I]n the exertion of its power over interstate commerce, [Congress] may
regulate the relations of common carriers by railroad and their employees, while both are
engaged in such commerce, subject always to the limitations prescribed in the Constitution,
and to the qualification that the particulars in which those relations are regulated must have
a real or substantial connection with the interstate commerce in which the carriers and their
employees are engaged.”); Kennedy-Wilkins, supra note 76, at 1601 (concluding that
“employment activities the Court considered within the realm of interstate commerce and
those they considered outside of that realm is [sic] consistent with a broad reading of the
language that was used in the Section 1 exemption”).
179 Howard, 207 U.S. at 498.
180 Kennedy-Wilkins, supra note 76, at 1601; see Howard, 207 U.S. at 499 (“As the act thus
includes many subjects wholly beyond the power to regulate commerce, and depends for its
sanction upon that authority, it results that the act is repugnant to the Constitution, and
cannot be enforced unless there be merit in the propositions advanced to show that the statute
may be saved.”).
181 Mondou, 223 U.S. at 46.
182 Id. at 47 (emphasis added).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2021

31

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 6

330

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:299

“understood to have a more limited reach.”183 Even following New
Prime’s instruction that words should have their ordinary meaning
at the time of a statute’s enactment, the phrase “engaged in
interstate commerce” would still require a transportation worker to
move across state lines.184
Circuit City provides the correct structural framework to follow,
and it supports the interpretation of the Section 1 exemption as
requiring transportation workers to cross state lines.185 The Court
in Circuit City indicated that the phrase “any other class of workers”
requires applying the maxim ejusdem generis, which groups
“transportation worker” with “seamen” and “railroad employees.”186
This reading requires “transportation worker” to be “controlled and
defined by reference to the enumerated categories of workers which
are recited just before it.”187 Two rationales exist for applying this
canon: First, “[w]hen the initial terms all belong to an obvious and
readily identifiable genus, one presumes that the speaker or writer
has that category in mind for the entire passage. . . . And second,
when the tagalong general term is given its broadest application, it
renders the prior enumeration superfluous.”188 In the case of the
FAA, if Congress intended “to extend section 1's residual clause to
183 Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001); see also Hamrick v. Partsfleet,
LLC, 1 F.4th 1337, 1347 (11th Cir. 2021) (“The Circuit City Court did not hold, because the
issue was not before it, that the transportation worker exemption applied to a class of workers
that made intrastate deliveries of goods that had traveled in interstate commerce, even if the
class itself did not actually engage in interstate commerce.”).
184 See Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 904, 925–26 (9th Cir. 2020) (Bress, J.,
dissenting) (relying on New Prime’s ordinary meaning analysis to find that “dictionary
definitions from the relevant time” aid in discerning the ordinary meaning of the phrase
“engaged in interstate commerce,” which would require crossing state lines).
185 See Cir. City, 532 U.S. at 115–16 (recalling that the phrase “involving commerce” in
Section 2 is meant to have a broad reading to signal Congress’s intent to exercise its commerce
power to the fullest extent, while Section 1’s “engaged in language” is “understood to have a
more limited reach”).
186 Id. at 114–15; see also Rittmann, 971 F.3d at 927 (Bress, J., dissenting) (“Neither of
these classes of workers is defined with reference to the provenance of the goods (or people)
they transport. Instead, the FAA casts them at a high level of generality, referring to the
broad type of work they perform.”).
187 Cir. City, 532 U.S. at 115; see also Rittmann, 971 F.3d at 928 (Bress, J., dissenting)
(“The statutory text in the FAA supports this approach because it refers to workers by their
‘class,’ reflecting the same paradigmatic approach as ejusdem generis itself. In this case, if
the statute excluded ‘seamen, railroad employees, and local delivery persons,’ it seems clear
that one is quite a bit less like the others.”).
188 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 171, at 199–200.
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classes of workers who transport both goods and passengers from
anywhere to anywhere, it would have presumably indicated this
intention by eliminating the enumerated categories preceding it, or
by using broader language than ‘engaged in . . . interstate
commerce.’”189
3. Legislative History and Context. Although the Court in Circuit
City did not resort to legislative history,190 congressional hearings
on the FAA also support the assertion that the drafters intended the
residual clause to require crossing state lines.191 At the Senate
hearing introducing the FAA in 1923, Charles Bernheimer, the
former chairman of the Arbitration Committee for the New York
Chamber of Commerce, presented the bill as one that aimed “to
eliminate friction, delay, and waste, and . . . to establish and
maintain business amity and to reduce the price of commodities to
the consumer.”192 In the same hearing, Francis B. James, the former
chairman of both the Committee on Commercial Law and the
Committee on Commerce and Trade Law of the American Bar
Association, indicated that interstate transportation occurs when
“goods are shipped from one point in a State to another point in the
same State, passing through another State.”193 At the time of the
FAA’s enactment, “the transportation of goods sold or contracted to
be sold as described in the first section of the bill [was] interstate or
foreign commerce,” determined by “whether the goods are to be
transported to or through another State.”194
One year later, the scope of interstate commerce was again
discussed at the Joint Hearings before the Subcommittees of the
Committees on the Judiciary.195 When asked by the Chairman

189 Tamar Meshel, If Apps Be the Food of the Future, Arbitrate On!: Mobile-Based RideSharing, Transportation Workers, and Interstate Commerce, 15 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 1, 43
(2020) (alteration in original).
190 Cir. City, 532 U.S. at 119 (“As the conclusion we reach today is directed by the text of §
1, we need not assess the legislative history of the exclusion provision.”).
191 See, e.g., infra note 195 and accompanying text.
192 Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal
Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 3 (1923) (statement of Charles Bernheimer, Former Chairman,
Arbitration Committee, New York Chamber of Commerce).
193 Id. at 12.
194 Id. at 17 (Brief in Support of S. 4213).
195 Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646
Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 7 (1924).
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whether the proposed FAA bill related to “contracts arising in
interstate commerce,” Charles Bernheimer indicated that the bill
related to interstate commerce entirely, even offering an example of
a “farmer who will sell his carload of potatoes, from Wyoming, to a
dealer in the State of New Jersey.”196 These exchanges reveal that
at the time of its enactment, the FAA was intended to reach only
workers employed in the physical traffic of commerce.
Consequently, the legislative history, although sparse, does indicate
that crossing state lines must be involved to constitute interstate
commerce.
B. PRACTICAL ANALYSIS

A narrow approach resolves the current inconsistency that lower
courts have created by generating their own tests and cherrypicking the types of gig economy drivers to be exempt under Section
1. To illustrate this inconsistency, consider the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Rittmann.197 That court applied the exemption to
Amazon last-mile drivers,198 but the Northern District of California
in Capriole v. Uber Technologies, Inc. later refused to extend the
arbitration exemption to Uber rideshare drivers, finding that “Uber
drivers, as a class, ‘are not engaged in interstate commerce’ because
their work ‘predominantly entails intrastate trips.’”199 The Capriole
court stated that the exemption did not apply because “Uber’s
service is primarily local and intrastate in nature,”200 despite the
argument that the nature of rideshare drivers’ work is nearly
identical to that of workers who transport goods.201 Likewise, the

196 Id. (statement of Charles Bernheimer, Former Chairman, Arbitration Committee, New
York Chamber of Commerce).
197 Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2020).
198 See id. at 921 (“We hold that the AmFlex delivery providers in this case are
transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce and are thus exempt from the FAA’s
enforcement provisions pursuant to § 1.”).
199 7 F.4th 854, 858 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting In re Grice, 974 F.3d 950, 956 (9th Cir. 2020)).
200 Id. at 864; see also Rogers v. Lyft, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 3d 904, 916 (N.D. Cal. 2020)
(determining that Lyft “is in the general business of giving people rides, not the particular
business of offering interstate transportation to passengers”).
201
See Rick Bales, “New Prime” and the Gig Economy, ARB. INFO.,
https://law.missouri.edu/arbitrationinfo/new-prime-gig-economy/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2021)
(“[L]ower courts should coalesce around an understanding that transporting people across
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Ninth Circuit in Rittmann further distinguished platform-based
food delivery drivers because those drivers “are not ‘engaged in the
interstate transport of goods’ because the prepared meals from local
restaurants are not a type of good that are ‘indisputably part of the
stream of commerce.’”202 Meanwhile, the Capriole court’s approach
contradicts Rittman and requires rideshare drivers to cross state
lines to be considered engaged in interstate commerce, mirroring
the narrow approach that the Seventh Circuit employed in
Wallace.203
Further, the courts in Waithaka and Rittmann both concluded
that Amazon Flex drivers are exempt from arbitration under
Section 1 because these drivers “haul goods on the final legs of
interstate journeys.”204 These courts, however, do not account for
the other aspects of the Amazon Flex program—such as delivering
groceries and household items, picking up orders from local stores
to deliver them directly to customers, and delivering packages from
Amazon delivery stations.205 These services are identical to those
offered by food delivery services, like Grubhub in Wallace, that hire
local delivery drivers via a smart phone application to transport
meals from restaurants to customers’ homes, schools, or offices.206
Finally, the narrow approach promotes judicial uniformity and
foreseeability in arbitrating employment suits involving gig

state lines for profit is indistinguishable, for purposes of the Section 1 exclusion, from
transporting goods.”).
202 Rittmann, 971 F.3d at 916 (quoting Levin v. Caviar, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1153
(N.D. Cal. 2015)).
203 Capriole, 7 F.4th at 865 (reasoning that because Uber is not in “the particular business
of offering interstate transportation to passengers” . . . interstate movement cannot be said
to be a ‘central part of the class members’ job description.’” (first quoting Rogers, 452 F. Supp.
3d at 916; and then quoting Wallace v. Grubhub Holdings, Inc., 970 F.3d 798, 801 (7th Cir.
2020))).
204 Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc., 966 F.3d 10, 26 (1st Cir. 2020) (emphasis added); see
also Rittmann, 971 F.3d at 907 (“In the AmFlex program, Amazon contracts with individuals
to make ‘last mile’ deliveries of products from Amazon warehouses to the products’
destinations using the AmFlex smart phone application.”).
205
Frequently
Asked
Questions
About
Amazon
Flex,
AMAZON
FLEX,
https://flex.amazon.com/faq (last visited Sept. 30, 2021).
206 See Wallace, 970 F.3d at 799 (“[Grubhub] provides a platform for diners to order takeout
from local restaurants, either online or via its mobile app. When a diner places an order
through Grubhub's app, Grubhub transmits the order to the restaurant, which then prepares
the diner's meal. Once the food is ready, the diner can either pick it up herself or request that
Grubhub dispatch a driver to deliver it to her.”).
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economy drivers. The broad approach does not consider that, by the
very nature of gig work, delivery drivers often drive for multiple
companies that provide different types of services.207 Applying the
broad approach would suggest that an individual driving for
Amazon Flex during a morning shift and Grubhub in the evening
would find herself in two wildly opposite arbitration dilemmas for
substantially the same work.208 The broad approach also does not
consider the implications that this rule will have on delivery drivers
for other businesses, like furniture stores or florists, whose goods
may originate out-of-state.209 The narrow approach, on the other
hand, applies evenly to various gig economy drivers, including both
those who deliver goods and food and those who transport people,
because it requires any gig economy driver to cross state lines.210 By
requiring drivers to cross state lines to be deemed exempt from
arbitration, courts applying the narrow approach would minimize
the current inconsistencies resulting from conflicting applications
of the Section 1 exemption to gig drivers.
C. A DEFENSE OF ARBITRATION

Courts finding that gig economy delivery drivers are exempt from
arbitration as transportation workers “engaged in . . . interstate

See supra Part I; see also, e.g., Lizette Chapman, Lyft Tells Drivers to Work for Amazon
After Ridership Plummets, BLOOMBERG QUINT (Mar. 30, 2020, 8:45 P.M.),
https://www.bloombergquint.com/technology/amazon-teams-up-with-lyft-to-recruit-driversfor-deliveries (documenting that in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has affected the
need for certain services like ridesharing and food delivery services, “Amazon.com Inc. [has
teamed] up with Lyft Inc. on recruiting the ride-hailing company’s drivers to deliver
packages).
208 See Rittmann, 971 F.3d at 938 (Bress, J., dissenting) (“Under the majority opinion,
therefore, the same person performing the same type of work at the same time through the
same means is required to arbitrate against some employers but not others.”).
209 Id. at 936; see also Wallace, 970 F.3d at 802 (“By erasing [the requirement to cross state
lines] from the statute, the plaintiffs’ interpretation would sweep in numerous categories of
workers whose occupations have nothing to do with interstate transport—for example, dry
cleaners who deliver pressed shirts manufactured in Taiwan and ice cream truck drivers
selling treats made with milk from an out-of-state dairy.”).
210 Cf. O’Shea v. Maplebear Inc., 508 F. Supp. 3d 279, 287 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (“[D]rivers [for
Instacart, a grocery delivery platform company] who deliver food purchased over the internet
from a grocery store differ in no material way from drivers who pick up food purchased over
the web from a restaurant.”).
207
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commerce”211 undermine the purpose of arbitration as an efficient
and effective means of dispute resolution.212 The Section 1
transportation worker carveout should not be interpreted to exempt
delivery drivers because a long line of Supreme Court precedent
establishes that arbitration is an appropriate mechanism for
employment agreement dispute resolution.213 Further, there is
evidence that, compared to litigation, arbitration is a more viable
dispute resolution option for employees because it offers them a
forum to settle a dispute,214 and it is more cost-effective for involved
parties.215
There is strong opposition to imposing arbitration agreements in
employment contracts.216 This opposition, however, is unwarranted.
9 U.S.C. § 1.
See Rittmann, 971 F.3d at 937 (Bress, J., dissenting) (“Undertaking such confounding
inquiries in the context of the FAA is particularly undesirable when the result will inevitably
mean more complex civil litigation over the availability of a private dispute resolution
mechanism that is supposed to itself reduce costs.”).
213 See, e.g., Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001) (“We have been clear
in rejecting the supposition that the advantages of the arbitration process somehow disappear
when transferred to the employment context.”).
214 See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why It’s Better Than It Looks, 41
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 783, 790–91 (2008) (stating that because litigation involves high costs
that bar low-income employees from litigating disputes and plaintiffs’ attorneys are often
unwilling to take certain cases, arbitration gives plaintiffs an accessible forum); id. at 794
(“Since employers win the vast majority of summary judgments in federal court employment
cases, and since employers naturally try to buy out the stronger employee cases during
preliminary proceedings in litigation, decent arguments can be made either way about
whether trial results exaggerate or depress employee win rates, at least in federal court.”);
see also Peter B. Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 560–62 (2008)
(highlighting various studies that indicate that there is a perception among parties that
arbitration leads to satisfactory results for claimants).
215 See Cir. City, 532 U.S. at 123 (“Arbitration agreements allow parties to avoid the costs
of litigation, a benefit that may be of particular importance in employment litigation, which
often involves smaller sums of money than disputes concerning commercial contracts.”); see
also Rutledge, supra note 214, at 568–69 (providing examples of how arbitration can be costeffective).
216 See, e.g., Stacy A. Hickox, Ensuring Enforceability and Fairness in the Arbitration of
Employment Disputes, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 101, 102 (2010) (“[C]oncerns have been expressed
about the fairness of requiring employees to rely on arbitrators to enforce their statutory
rights.”); see also Imre S. Szalai, The Supreme Court’s Landmark Decision in New Prime Inc.
v. Oliveira: A Panoptic View of America’s Civil Justice System and Arbitration, 68 EMORY L.J.
ONLINE 1059, 1060 (2019) (“In the wake of the #MeToo movement, a public backlash has
developed against the widespread use of forced arbitration in America, with bipartisan
support for legislative reforms as well as some private initiatives to cut back on the use of
arbitration.”). But see Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can Be Against Fairness? The Case Against the
211
212

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2021

37

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 6

336

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:299

The critique of employment arbitration generally focuses on two
considerations: whether workers knowingly agree or understand
that they are agreeing to arbitrate disputes when they sign
agreements with such clauses and whether the arbitral process will
be unfair for employees.217
As to the first critique, some argue that many arbitration
agreements in employment contracts can be easily overlooked
because “they are printed in small type,” are buried in lengthy
contracts, or are hidden “behind a link that the signer is unlikely
to” read.218 The second critique suggests that arbitration is
inherently unfair towards employees because it may not be easily
accessible for them or because it is biased in favor of employers.219
In addition to the lack of conclusive data to support these
critiques,220 both raw and comparative win rate data indicate that
employee-claimants are as likely as or more likely than employerdefendants to succeed in arbitration.221 Moreover, in response to the
argument that arbitration may be unfair towards low-wage earners

Arbitration Fairness Act, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 267, 267 (2008) (“Abolishing the
system of enforceable pre-dispute agreements, as proponents of the Arbitration Fairness Act
urge, would hardly improve the lot of the average individual.”).
217 See Garden, supra note 4, at 206–07 (highlighting that the lack of consent and the lack
of public scrutiny are two problems associated with individual arbitration in her discussion
of arbitration and gig economy workers); see also Hickox, supra note 216, at 126 (“There have
been two main reasons to challenge the fairness of the arbitration program: the fairness of
the process itself; and the alleged bias of the arbitrators. Issues of fairness have not been
addressed by recent Supreme Court decisions upholding employees’ obligations to arbitrate
employment disputes.” (footnote omitted)).
218 Garden, supra note 4, at 207.
219 See id. (suggesting that criticism against arbitration includes “the possibility that the
arbitral forum will be more expensive to access or farther away from the plaintiff ’s home or
work than a judicial forum, that discovery will be limited or unavailable, and the chance that
the ‘repeat player’ phenomenon will erode workers’ or consumers’ recoveries”).
220 See id. at 208 (“Unfortunately, empirical evidence about how workers fare in arbitration
is inconclusive.”).
221 See Rutledge, supra note 214, at 556–58 (demonstrating that studies indicate that
employees fair favorably in arbitration). But see STONE & COLVIN, supra note 14, at 19
(indicating that “the employee win rate in arbitration is 35.7 percent lower than the employee
win rate in federal court” but because most cases settle before going to trial, “it is possible
that settlement patterns could explain part of the difference between trial and arbitration
outcomes”).
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who cannot afford proper arbitral representation,222 data suggests
that lower-compensated workers do not have a better chance at
litigation because adequate attorneys turn down the vast majority
of employees seeking representation.223
While arbitration is proven to be an effective and viable option
for employment disputes, arbitration is not the best option for every
employer-worker relationship.224 In light of the large number of
suits brought by delivery drivers and the issues related to
arbitrating these disputes,225 arbitration might not be an
appropriate solution. But it is not because these drivers are exempt
under Section 1. Rather, it is because the factors for choosing
arbitration do not make sense in these cases. In deciding whether
to choose arbitration as the dispute resolution mechanism for
disputes involving gig economy drivers, platform companies should
consider various factors, including the following:
(1) The quality of the assent process.
(2) The probability that arbitration will be concluded
faster and with less cost than litigation.
(3) The importance of informality in the process.
(4) The importance of privacy.

222 See Garden, supra note 4, at 211 (“Even where companies commit to picking up arbitral
forum costs . . . workers are still unlikely to arbitrate their low-dollar claims for a list of
reasons, including difficulty retaining counsel.”).
223 See Rutledge, supra note 214, at 559 (noting that one study found claimants’ attorneys
refused to take on 95% of cases presented to them); see also id. at 570 (arguing that “[c]ivil
litigation presents significant access to justice barriers for claimants” and that most cases are
settled or dismissed before the chance to go before a jury); Sarah Rudolph Cole, The Lost
Promise of Arbitration, 70 SMU L. REV. 849, 851 (2017) (contending that “[a]rbitration, unlike
mediation and negotiation, offers considerable promise to minority disputants facing a wellheeled opponent in a dispute”); St. Antoine, supra note 214, at 796 (“For most lower-paid
workers, [arbitration] may in fact be their only feasible option.”).
224 See MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 13, § 7.3.2 (“Arbitration is not for everyone or every
dispute.”).
225 See Michael Hiltzik, Column: DoorDash Thought It Was Smart to Force Workers to
Arbitrate but Now Faces Millions in Fees, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2020, 2:48 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-02-11/doordash-arbitration-blunder
(illustrating an example involving DoorDash, a meal delivery platform, that faced arbitration
filing fees of $12 to $20 million when 5,800 arbitration claims were filed by drivers against
the company, which prompted the company to insist on going to court instead of arbitrating
these disputes).
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(5) The likelihood that the arbitrators will render expert
justice responsive to party needs.
(6) The nature and complexity of the issues to be
decided.
(7) The attitude of the parties to arbitration and the
nature of the relationship between or among them.
(8) The importance of award finality as opposed to
judicial review.226
Going forward, it may be necessary for platform-based companies
that rely on gig workers to assess whether including arbitration
clauses in employment or independent contract agreements makes
sense, especially in cases where arbitration costs exceed potential
litigation costs.227 As it currently stands, however, parties have
validly entered into these arbitration agreements,228 and they
should be subject to arbitration when a dispute arises unless and
until Congress amends the FAA229 or the U.S. Supreme Court rules
on the scope of the Section 1 exemption.

V. CONCLUSION
While the ambiguous language of the Section 1 arbitration
exemption affords multiple interpretations of the extent to which a
transportation worker must be engaged in interstate commerce to
MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 13, § 7.3.2.
See Kevin R. Vozzo, Ninth Circuit Allows Arbitrator to Rule on Postmates’ Challenge to
Mass Arbitration Tactics, EPSTEIN BECKER GREEN: WAGE & HOUR DEF. BLOG (Oct. 5, 2020),
https://www.wagehourblog.com/2020/10/articles/california-wage-hour-law/ninth-circuitallows-arbitrator-to-rule-on-postmates-challenge-to-mass-arbitration-tactics/#page=1
(recounting a case from the Ninth Circuit in which plaintiffs’ attorneys commenced mass
arbitrations by filing more than 5,000 individual arbitration demands simultaneously to force
Postmates, a food and grocery delivery platform company, to pay arbitration filing fees, which
can amount to tens of millions of dollars).
228 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)
(“Having made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress itself
has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at
issue.”).
229 See Garden, supra note 4, at 225 (“[B]ecause the US Supreme Court has interpreted a
federal statute, the Federal Arbitration Act, to preempt states from adjudicating or
legislating limits on arbitration, the fix would have to be accomplished by Congress.” (quoting
MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE
OF LAW 224 (2013))).
226
227
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be exempt from arbitrating an employment dispute, a narrow
statutory reading is proper under the framework established by
U.S. Supreme Court precedent and the favorable view of arbitration
as a dispute resolution mechanism in the United States. To remain
consistent with Circuit City and New Prime and to avoid practical
application problems associated with differentiating between gig
economy delivery drivers by the platform(s) for which they drive,
lower courts should interpret the Section 1 exemption for workers
engaged in interstate commerce to require that workers themselves
actually cross state lines. This narrow interpretation of the
statutory text stays true to the meaning of the phrase “engaged in
interstate commerce” at the time of the FAA’s enactment in 1925,
by which courts should abide unless and until Congress230 or the
U.S. Supreme Court rules otherwise.231

230 See Meshel, supra note 189, at 43 (“Should Congress now view the activities of [mobilebased transportation network companies like Uber and Lyft] and their drivers as properly
falling outside of the purview of the FAA, Congress may amend the Act.”).
231 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword to SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 171, at xxi (“The
court’s job is to carry out the legislative project, not to change it in conformity with the judge’s
view of sound policy.”).
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